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IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS

PATRICIA BECKMAN
Plaintiff-Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

vs.
CYBERTARY FRANCHISING, LLC,
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY, LLC, and
CHRISTIAN FAULCONER,

Appeal No. 20150295-CA
Fourth District Case No. 110402922

Defendants-Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT.PATRICIA BECKMAN

JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.§ 78A-3-102(4) and§ 78A-4-103(2)G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
First Issue: Whether jury instruction number 12-regarding "cause" for

termination-incorrectly included the definition of 'Just cause" announced in Uintah
Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2005 UT App 92, if 16, 110 P.3d 168.
Standard of review: Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness. Clayton v. Ford
Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, if8, 214 P .3d 865.
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Citation to the Record: This issue was preserved for appeal via Beckman' s
proposed jury instructions (R. 1309) and Beckman's objection to the District Court's
final instructions. (R. 1853).

Second Issue: Whether the District Court incorrectly concluded that Beckman and
Cybertary were both the "nonprevailing party" pursuant to section 16 of the Employment
Agreement.
Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract is a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irr. Co., 2011 UT 33, if 19,
258 P.3d 539.
Citation to the Record: This issue was preserved for appeal via Beckman' s
memorandum in opposition to Appellees' motion for attorney's fees. (R. 1729).

Third Issue: Whether the District Court incorrectly interpreted Beckman's
amended complaint and concluded that Beckman asserted a cause of action against all
three Appellees for breach of the Employment Agreement.
Standard of review: Whether attorney's fees are recoverable is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, if8, 38 P.3d 1011.
Interpretation of a pleading is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Mower v.

Simpson, 2012 UT App 149, if7, 278 PJd 1076.
Citation to the Record: This issue was preserved for appeal via Beckman' s
memorandum in opposition to Appellees' motion for attorney's fees. (R. 1729).

Fourth Issue: Whether the District incorrectly concluded that Beckman was not
entitled to an award of prejudgment interest.
2
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Standard of review: A decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT
20, ,I28, 133 P.3d 428.
Citation to the Record: This issue was preserved for appeal via Beckman' s motion
for prejudgment interest. (R. 1601 ).
Fifth Issue: Whether the District Court incorrectly applied Utah R. Evid. 408 and
abused its discretion when it excluded an audio recording of a phone call from October
19, 2011 on the grounds that the recording was "compromise negotiations".
Standard of review: In reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial,
there are two standards of review. First, the trial court's interpretation and application of
a rule of evidence is reviewed for correctness. Utah Dept. of Transp. v. 6200 South
Assocs., 872 P.2d 462, 465 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Santonio, 2011 UT App 385, ,Il 1,
265 P.3d 822. Second, if the rule of evidence requires the trial court to balance specified
factors to determine admissibility, the trial court's ruling is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Utah Dept. of Transp., supra.
Citation to the Record: This issue was preserved for appeal via Beckman' s
memorandum in opposition to Appellees' motion in limine to exclude the recording. (R.
1168).
Sixth Issue: Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it denied
Beckman' s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on the grounds that the
motion was untimely, unreasonably delayed, and prejudicial.

3
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Standard of review: A trial court's ruling on a motion to amend a pleading is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Shah v. Jntermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT
App 261, ,I6, 314 P.3d 1079.
Citation to the Record: This issue was preserved for appeal via Beckman' s motion
for leave to file second amended complaint. (R. 166-191 ).
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. Attorney fees -- Reciprocal rights to recover attorney
fees.

A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after
April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other
writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees.
Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-807. Duties of managers and members.

(I)
A member or manager shall not be liable or accountable in damages or otherwise
to the company or the members for any action taken or failure to act on behalf of the
company unless the act or omission constitutes:
(a)
gross negligence;
(b)
willful misconduct; or
(c)
a breach of a higher standard of conduct that would result in greater
exposure to liability for the member or manager that is established in the
company's articles of organization or operating agreement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Background

In 2005, Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia Beckman ("Beckman") founded Cybertary,
Inc. As the name implies, Cybertary franchisees provide virtual administrative assistants
to businesses nationwide. The virtual assistant answers calls, responds to emails, and
performs other administrative tasks from home rather than in the office. In the years that

vvb
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followed, Ms. Beckman tirelessly worked to grow Cybertary to a formidable 26
franchises in 16 states. In 20 I 0, Ms. Beckman had the misfortune of meeting DefendantAppellee Christian Faulconer ("Faulconer").
Faulconer, a gifted salesman, was the President and CEO of Defendant-Appellee
Franchise Foundry, LLC (Franchise Foundry). Fauconer persuaded Beckman to enter into
several contracts wherein Beckman relinquished majority ownership in Cybertary in
exchange for Franchise Foundry's agreement to provide sales, marketing, and support
services.
In July 20 I 0, the parties finalized three separate agreements: (I) an employment

~·

agreement between Beckman and Cybertary; (2) an operating agreement for Cybertary,
and (3) a service agreement between Cybertary and Franchise Foundry. As a result of
these agreements, "Cybertary, Inc." became Defendant-Appellee Cybertary Franchising,
LLC ("Cybertary").
Thereafter, Ms. Beckman continued working hard and diligently performed her
duties as CEO. In contrast, Faulconer and Franchise Foundry did next to nothing, but
nevertheless happily accepted thousands in service fees and franchise royalty fees. With
control of Cybertary's finances, Faulconer also refused to pay Beckman her wages and
other employment benefits.
After months of not getting paid her salary, not having her debts serviced in
accordance with the Cybertary operating agreement, Beckman had no alternative but to
file for bankruptcy in May 2011. Meanwhile, Franchise Foundry happily accepted
payments of $20,800 each month for doing virtually nothing. With her business on the
5
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brink of collapse, her credit ruined, and having been driven nearly to destitution,
Beckman had enough. On November 2, 2011, Beckman filed an action in Fourth District
Court against Cybertary to recover her unpaid wages and other employment benefits.
Twelve days later, Faulconer retaliated and sent Beckman a notice of her termination as
Cybertary's CEO.
Course of the Proceedings in the District Court

In her complaint, Beckman asserted claims for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment, and quantified her damages as being in excess of $300,000. (R. 1-5). In her
amended complaint, filed on November 21, 2011, Beckman added Franchise Foundry,
Faulconer, Franchise Foundry Holdings, ULC" (hereinafter, "Franchise Holdings"), and
K. Todd Hicks ("Hicks") as Defendants. (R. 10-17). 1 In addition to her claims for breach
of the employment agreement and unjust enrichment (against Cybertary), Beckman
brought a claim for declaratory relief against all five Defendants.
On December 9, 2011, Cybertary filed its Answer and Counterclaim. 2 (R. 40). On
December 29, 2011, Franchise Foundry and Faulconer filed their motion to dismiss. (R.
49-91). The motion was denied on May 29, 2012. (R. 147). Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer filed their Answer on June 18, 2012. (R. 157)

1

The operating agreement appointed Beckman, Faulconer, and a third individual, K.
Todd Hicks, as managers of Cybertary. Franchise Holdings and Hicks were never served
with the complaint and never made an appearance in this case.
2

Cybertary brought causes of against Beckman for breach of the employment agreement,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty,
interference with existing and potential economic relations, unfair competition, and
request for injunctive relief.

vj
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After Beckman declared bankruptcy in May 2012, her previous counsel withdrew
from the case. (R. 141). With new counsel, on March 15, 2013, Beckman filed a motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint to add causes action for breach of the
Cybertary operating agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conspiracy. (R. 166191 ). On May 30, 2013, the District Court denied Beckman's motion on the grounds that
it was untimely, unreasonably delayed, and would be prejudicial. (R. 352).
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

After the motion for leave was denied, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. (R. 355-423, 426-639). On January 2, 2014, the District Court entered its order

~

denying Beckman's motion and partially granting Cybertary's motion. (R. 899). The
District Court interpreted Beckman' s Amended Complaint as asserting a cause of action
~

for breach of the employment agreement against Franchise Foundry and Faulconer, and
then disiµissed that claim. (Id.) This despite the fact that Beckman openly admittedindeed, she argued-that she never asserted a cause of action for breach of the

~

employment agreement. (R. 683, 1851 at p. 35).
The Four-Day Jury Trial

The four-day jury trial occurred from October 7-10, 2014. On the third day of trial
(October 9), Beckman objected to Appellees presenting any evidence or testimony on the
issue of Cybertary's alleged damages. Beckman's objection was predicated on the fact
that Cybertary did not provide a timely damages calculation in accordance with Utah R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(c). More specifically, Cybertary did not provide a damages calculation

7
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until June 2014 (long after the close of fact discovery). (R. 1577). The District Court
sustained Beckman's objection. (R. 1459).
At the close of Appellees' case, Beckman moved for a directed verdict on
Cybertary's counterclaims. The District Court partially granted the motion, dismissing all
but one of Cybertary's counterclaims (the request for injunctive relief). (R.1459). In the
late afternoon of October 10, after approximately three and a half hours of deliberation,
the jury returned its verdict. (R. 1495-1502). The jury concluded: (1) Cybertary breached
the employment agreement by failing to pay Beckman's wages and other benefits; (2)
Cybertary did not breach the agreement when it terminated her employment; and (3)
neither Franchise Foundry nor Faulconer acted with willful misconduct or gross
neglience. (Id.). The jury awarded Ms. Beckman $84,913.83 in unpaid salary and
$18,150 in unpaid benefits, for which Cybertary was solely liable. (Id.)
Post-Trial Motions

Ms. Beckman filed post-trial motions for her attorney's fees and for prejudgment
interest. (R. 1504, 1601). Appellees filed their own post-judgment motion for attorney's
fees. (R. 1610). On March 12, 2015, the District Court entered its order: (1) granting
Beckman's request for fees; (2) denying Beckman's request for prejudgment interest; (3)
granting Cybertary's request for fees (and the offsetting those fees against Beck.man's
fees); and (4) granting Franchise Foundry's and Faulconer's request for fees. (R. 1823).
The District Court calculated the fees award as follows: Beckman was awarded
$75,317.24 in fees and costs against Cybertary. (R. 1820). Cybertary was awarded
$62,181.90 in fees and costs against Beckman. (Id.). The Court offset Cybertary's fees
8
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against Beckman's fees, making Beckman's final fees award $13,135.34. (Id.). The
District Court awarded fees to Franchise Foundry and Faulconer in the amount of
$27,153.33. (R. 1819).
In this same order, the District Court dismissed Cybertary's sole remammg

~

counterclaim for injunctive relief. (Id).
Final Judgment
~

Also on March 12, 2015, the District Court entered a final judgment awarding
Beckman the principle amount of $103,063.83 in damages, plus attorney's fees in the
amount of $13,135.34. (R. 1831). Beckman's judgment was against Cybertary only.
That same day, the District Court also entered a final judgment in favor of
Franchise Foundry and Faulconer (against Beckman) for $27,153.33. (R. 1827).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Background

1.

In 2005, Beckman founded Cybertary to meet the growing demand for

reliable, professional a~inistrative outsourcing. Cybertary grew quickly into a diverse,
talented network of Virtual Assistants who provided services to small business owners.
(Id.)
2.

Franchise Foundry is a Utah limited liability company that holds itself out

as a business that provides marketing and investing services to franchise businesses. (R.
385, 636).

3.

Faulconer is a "principal" of Franchise Foundry, and has described himself

as the "President" of Franchise Foundry. (R. 16, 637).
9
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4.

Franchise Holdings is a Canadian unlimited liability company. Hicks is a

"principal" of Franchise Holdings. (R. 16).
5.

In March 2010, Ms. Beckman met Faulconer at a business conference in

Las Vegas. Faulconer introduced himself as an officer of Franchise Foundry, described
Franchise Foundry's marketing services, and expressed interest in "investing" in
Cybertary. (Id.)
~

6.

Faulconer proposed that Franchise Foundry would provide marketing

services to Cybertary in exchange for a minority share of Cybertary. Faulconer also
presented a Proforma to forecast franchise sales that Cybertary would make with
Franchise Foundry's marketing assistance. {Id.)
7.

After several negotiations in April and May 2010, Faulconer and Beckman

reached an agreement on terms of an operating agreement for Cybertary, a service
agreement between Cybertary and Franchise Foundry, and an employment agreement for
Beckman to work as Cybertary's CEO. (R. 383-384).
The Cybertary Operating Agreement

8.

Effective July 6, 20 I0, Beckman, Franchise Foundry, and Franchise

Holdings entered into the Cybertary Operating Agreement (the "Operating Agreement").
(See Pia. Trial Ex. 2).
9.

The Operating Agreement appoints Beckman, Hicks, and Faulconer as

managers of Cybertary. {Id. at Article 6.1.2).
I 0.

Under the Operating Agreement, Cybertary's members are Beckman,

Franchise Holdings, and Franchise Foundry. Beckman owned 40% of the ownership
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"units" in Cybertary, Franchise Holdings owned 57% of the units, and Franchise Foundry
owned the remaining 3%. (Id. at Article 2.3, and Exhibit A thereto).
11.

The Operating Agreement states that Franchise Foundry and Franchise

Holdings were required to assist Beckman by paying off Cybertary's debts, many of
which Beckman had personally guaranteed. (Id. at Article 5.5).
12.

Cybertary's employment decisions must have approval of members holding

two-thirds of the interests in the company (a "super-majority"). (Id. at Article 6.8).
13.

The Operating Agreement states that the liability of individual members

"shall be eliminated or limited to the fullest extent as from time to time permitted by Utah

~

law." (Id. at Article 10).
The Employment Agreement

14.

Beckman and Cybertary executed a written employment agreement (the

"Employment Agreement") in July 20 I 0. (R. 383; see also, Pla. Trial Ex. 1). The term of
the Employment Agreement was three years. (Id. at section l ).
15.

Under the terms of the Employment Agreement, Beckman's base salary

should have been paid as follows:
June 2010: $5,000
July 2010: $6,000
August 2010: $7,000
September 2010 - May 2011 : $7,500 per month;
June 2011 - May 2012: $8,250 per month;
June 2012 - May 2013; $9,075 per month;
(Pia. Trial Ex. 1, section 3)
~
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16.

The Employment Agreement states that Beckman was to be paid in semi-

monthly installments: on the 15th day and the last day of each month. Cybertary also
agreed to pay Beckman a monthly benefits allowance of $1,100, and incentive bonuses
for franchises sold. (Id. and sections 3 and 4)
17.

Under the Employment Agreement,

Beckman's employment with

Cybertary may only be terminated for three reasons: ( 1) death or disability, (2) for cause,
or (3) Beckman' s resignation. (Id. at section 6).
18.

The Employment Agreement defines "cause" to means one of seven

reasons, including:
(ii)

"Executive's willful breach, habitual neglect, gross neglect, or dereliction
of Executive's duties under this Agreement;"

(iii)

"Executive's material misconduct with regard to the Company, including,
but not limited to, Executive's failure to comply with Company's written
rules and policies;"

(vi)

"Any conduct, whether dishonest, fraudulent, or otherwise, that discredits
the Company or is detrimental to the reputation of the Company or the
Company's results of operations or business";

{Id.)
VI

19.

Any and all waivers had to be in writing and signed by the waiving party.

(Id. at section 11 ).
vi

The Service Agreement

20.

In July 2010, Cybertary and Franchise Foundry entered into a written

service agreement (the "Service Agreement"). (Pia. Trial Ex. 4).
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21.

Under the terms of the Service Agreement, Franchise Foundry agreed to

provide several marketing services and franchise development services. (Id. at section
3.1). Franchise Foundry also agreed to provide sales services. (Id. at section 3.2).
22.

As consideration for those services, Cybertary agreed to pay Franchise

Foundry a $250,000 development fee in 12 monthly installments. (Id. at section 4).
Cybertary also agreed to pay Franchise Foundry commissions in connection with new
franchise sales. (Id.)
Beckman's performance as Cybertary's CEO

23.

Beckman performed her duties and responsibilities as Cybertary's CEO

competent} y, diligently, and effecti vel y. 3 (R. 3 81-3 82).
24.

Beckman efficiently kept operating costs under control, she kept franchisee

validation rates high, and she closed the few sales prospects that were presented to her.
Ms. Beckman was well-respected and trusted by franchisees. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 18).
25.

Without any assistance, Ms. Beckman ran all aspects of Cybertary's

operations, from accounting, franchisee training and coaching, newsletters, public
relations, and system improvement. (Id.).
26.

Multiple Cybertary franchisees submitted written statements where they

verified Beckman's exemplary performance as CEO. (Id.).

3

At trial, the Appellees disputed the sufficiency of Ms. Beckman' s performance.
However, for purposes of this appeal, the relevant issue is the jury instruction relating to
"cause" for her termination. Thus, a comprehensive presentation of facts from the trial
rec~rd regarding Beckman' s performance is unnecessary at this time. For brevity,
Beckman limits her presentation of the facts to those that are necessary to evaluating the
issues on appeal. See Utah R. App. 24(a)(7).
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Franchise Foundry's abysmal performance

27.

Before Franchise Foundry became involved, and without Franchise

Foundry's "assistance," Cybertary closed 15 sales in the six months preceding Franchise
Foundry's involvement, with a solid flow of sales leads. (Pia. Trial Ex. 14).
28.

Despite being paid $265,751 by Cybertary (See Pla. Trial Ex. 34),

Franchise Foundry closed only 4 sales in 15 months. (Id.). In other words, Franchise
~

Foundry was paid over a quarter-million dollars but only achieved only 10. 7% of the
sales Cybertary achieved without Franchise Foundry's so-called "services". (See Pia.
Trial Ex. 14).
Cybertary's failure to pay Beckman's wages and benefits

29.

Despite Beckman's effective and hard work, Cybertary failed to pay

Beckman's wages and benefits in accordance with the Employment Agreement. (R. 378380; see also Pia. Trial Ex. 33 and 34).
30.

In total, Cybertary failed to pay Beckman $235,041.05 in wages and

benefits that were owed under the Employment Agreement. (See Pla. Trial Ex. 33 and
34).
Beckman 's Bankruptcy

31.

On March 30, 2011, Beckman sent an email to Faulconer wherein she

stated she is desperately in need of her wages:
"I am a single parent whose daughters need clothes, tutors & braces. When I have
to go months without a regular paycheck, I can't pay the mortgage, let alone
consider braces or tutors." (See Def. Trial Ex. I).

~
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"I feel I am making plenty of personal and financial sacrifices to protect the
interest of Cybertary Franchising. Giving up my compensation further to increase
the compensation elsewhere is not reasonable." (Id.).
32.

After months of working without getting paid her wages, and because

Cybertary was not servicing its own debts (debts that Beckman personally guaranteed) in

~

accordance with the Operating Agreement, Beckman was left with no alternative but to
file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on May 20, 2011. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 50).
33.

On September 8, 2011, Faulconer notified Beckman that he contacted the

Trustee "expressing an interest in making an offer on [Beckman's] membership units in
Cybertary." (See Pia. Trial Ex. 11). According to Faulconer, "This is not an effort to

~

sabotage, but rather to protect." (Id.).
34.

The bankruptcy Trustee (Susan Didriksen) filed her final report on August
~

20, 2012. (Id.).
The Recorded Phone Call on October 19, 2011

35.

On October 11, 2011, Beckman's previous counsel sent Cybertary a letter

wherein he demanded that Cybertary pay Beckman' s wages other compensation. (R.
1195-96). Beckman's previous counsel threatened to bring litigation if those amounts
remained unpaid. (Id.).
36.

On October 18, 2011, Faulconer sent Beckman an email wherein he stated

that the phone call set for the following day was '"for settlement purposes only." (R.
1192).
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3 7.

On the morning of October 19, 2011, before the phone call occurred,

Beckman sent Faulconer an email wherein she recommended that Faulconer "solicit legal
counsel." (R. 1193 ).
38.

Thereafter, Beckman and Faulconer had a 90-minute recorded phone

conversation. (R. 1023-1030). 4
39.

At the outset of the recording, Faulconer stated, "This whole conversation .

. . is really just for settlement purposes only ... anything we say on this call is that ...
we're trying to reach a settlement ... let's just be really frank and honest and try to make
this work." (R. I 026-1027).
40.

In the recording, Faulconer made the following statements:

(I)

Repeatedly admitted that Cybertary owes Beckman wages. (Recording at
34:30, 43:55, 1:09:00, 1: 17:20)

(2)

"We have an obligation to Patricia we have to pay ... We have an ongoing
obligation to Patricia we need to continue to meet." (Recording at 1: I 0:30)

(3)

Admitted that Beckman is "owed more than the company has." (Id. at
34:30)

(4)

Agreed that Beckman should not and could not work for free. {Id. at 43:30,
44:30)

(5)

The only way for Cybertary to pay Beckman is her wages is to "put
together a plan for profitability". (Id. at 54:45)

(6)

If and how Beckman gets paid is subject to approval from Faulconer and
Hicks. (Id. at 44:50)

i;;j

~

4

Appellees submitted the MP3 recording of the phone call with their motion in limine.
The trial record assembled by the District Court clerk does not contain the audio CD
Appellees submitted. To enable this Court to hear the recording, Beckman provides a
copy of the recording on the same disc that contains a searchable PDF version of this
brief.
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(7)

Cybertary had no intent of terminating Beckman's employment. (Id. at
12:30, 21 :08, 30:20, 30:45, 42:55, 1:23:35)

(8)

He would speak to Hicks about making an "interim" payment to Beckman
equivalent to one week's pay. (Id. at 1:23:50, I :28: 15).

(9)

Possible payment of $2,000 to Beckman as a "good faith token" ... "it's
just a token." (Id. at 1:28:45)

41.

During the call, Beckman stated:

"Now you said this discussion is for settlement purposes only ... this issue can get
much bigger than the employment agreement, but know that the Employment
Agreement cannot be terminated without my vote ... the responsibilities for the
salary, the benefits, and the debt repayment will remain as long as the
Employment Agreement is in force." (Id. at 20:50-21 :20).

~

"I want Franchise Foundry out of my business completely." (16:50).
"The employment dispute is really just the beginning." ( 17:20).
Beckman 's lawsuit and the retaliation that followed

42.

After Beckman's dem~nd for unpaid wages was ignored, Beckman filed her

Complaint in Fourth District Court on November 2, 2011. (R. 5).
43.

On November 14, 2011, Faulconer (purportedly on behalf of Cybertary, but

without the required super-majority approval) sent Beckman a letter wherein he stated
Beckman's employment had been terminated "for cause." (See Pia. Trial Ex. 19).
44.

In this letter, Faulconer claimed that "cause" for termination existed under

sections 6(b)(ii), (iii), and (vi) of the Employment Agreement. (Id.).
In the same letter, Faulconer accused Beckman of:
(a)

having an "intimate relationship with a representative of one of Cybertary's
key vendors";
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(b)

causing Cybertary "to distance itself from that vendor"; and

(c)

failing "to perform certain crucial duties related to
responsibility as Cybertary' s Chief Executive Officer".

[Beckman' s]

{Id.)

45.

Faulconer did not identify this "key vendor" or which "crucial duties" he

was referring to. {Id.)
46.

~

Beckman aggressively denied Faulconer's allegations, she noted the

complete lack of evidence supporting those allegations, and also noted that Faulconer
failed to identify any "crucial duties" she allegedly failed to perform. (See Pia. Trial Ex.
21).
47.

Beckman also noted that Faulconer lacked authority to terminate her

employment because he did not have the super-majority approval referenced in Article
6.8 of the Operating Agreement. (Id.)
48.

Appellees failed to prove that Faulconer' s allegations were true. More to

the point, Faulconer's allegations were false.

The Amended Complaint and the Appellees' Counterclaim
49.

On November 21, 2011, Beckman filed her Amended Complaint. (R. 10-

17). Because Beckman sought over $300,000 in damages, the case was classified as tier 3
discovery under Utah R. Civ. P. 26. (Id).
50.

On December 9, 2011, Cybertary filed its Answer and Counterclaim. (R.

40). Cybertary did not quantify its damages in the Counterclaim. (Id.)
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51.

On December 29, 2011, Franchise Foundry and Faulconer filed their

motion to dismiss. (R. 49-91). The motion was denied on May 29, 2012. (R. 147).
52.

Franchise Foundry and Faulconer filed their Answer on June 18, 2012. (R.

157). Appellees served their rule 26 initial disclosures on November 9, 2012. (R. 161 ).

The Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint

53.

On May 24, 2012-four days after Beckman filed for bankruptcy-her

previous counsel (Greg Savage) withdrew from the case. (R. 141).
54.

On August 1, 2012, Beckman's current counsel (Mr. Stavros) entered his

appearance in the case. (R. 159).
55.

Mr. Stavros identified causes of action that were not asserted by Mr.

Savage, but delayed filing a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint due to
Beckman' s pending bankruptcy. (R. 168). Beckman' s bankruptcy itself was further delayed
by Mr. Faulconer's offer to purchase Beckman's ownership units in Cybertary. (See Pia. Trial
Ex. 11).

56.

~

Beckman and Mr. Stavros were concerned that Beckman' s claims would be

seized by the bankruptcy trustee and made part of her bankruptcy estate. (R. 1850 at p. 5).
57.

The District Court took judicial notice that on March 20, 2012, the U.S.

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California authorized the sale of Ms.
Beckman's membership interest in Cybertary to Franchise Holdings. (R. 1489)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 19
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

58.

According to the bankruptcy trustee, as of March 18, 2013: "The U.S.

Trustee is currently reviewing the report.

Once that is completed, it will appear in

PACER and the Court will close the case." (R. 327).
59.

The final decree of bankruptcy was not issued until May 13, 2013. (R. 1850

at p. 5).
60.

On March l, 2013, Appellees propounded 18 interrogatories, 11 requests

for production, and nine requests for admissions. (R. 306).
6 I.

On March 15, 2013, Beckman filed her motion for leave to file second

amended complaint. (R. 166-190). Beckman sought leave to assert additional causes of
action for:
(I)

Breach of the Operating Agreement (against Franchise Foundry and
Franchise Holdings);

(2)

Breach of Fiduciary Duty (against Faulconer, Hicks, Franchise Foundry
and Franchise Holdings);

(3)

Fraudulent Inducement (against Faulconer and Hicks); and

(4)

Civil Conspiracy (against Faulconer, Hicks, Franchise Foundry, and
Franchise Holdings)

~

~

(R. 169, I 71-18 9).
68.
~

Appellees opposed Beckman's motion on the grounds that it was untimely,

the product of unreasonable delay, and prejudicial. (R. 298-309). The District Court
agreed with Appellees and denied Beckman's motion. (R. 352).

Facts relevant to iury instructions
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69.

On October 6, 2014, Beckman filed her proposed jury instructions and

Appellees filed their objections. (R. 1382, 1403). Beckman proposed an instruction for
"cause" for termination that was consistent with the definition of "cause" in the
Employment Agreement. (R. 1305-1306). Appellees objected to that definition on the
grounds that it must include the standard for 'just cause" as stated in Uintah Basin Med.
Ctr. v. Hardy, 2005 UT App 92, ,I 16, 110 P.3d 168). (R. 1399).
70.

The Appellees' proposed instruction modified the definition of "cause" to

state that determining whether "cause" existed was a "matter for Cybertary's good
business judgment" and all Cybertary needed was "a fair and honest cause or reason, in

~

good faith". (R. 1399)
71.

Foil owing oral arguments on the jury instructions, the District Court issued

its final jury instructions on October 10, 2014. (R. 1471-1494). The instruction relevant
to this appeal is jury instruction number 12 (hereinafter referred to as "Instruction 12" or
the "instruction") which pertains to "cause" for Ms. Beckman's termination. (R. 14811482). Instruction 12 contains the definition of "cause" from the Employment
Agreement, but also incorporated Appellees' requested proviso, as set forth above,
verbatim. (R. 1481).

Facts relating to preiudgment interest
72.

Beckman presented an itemized summary of the amounts she should have

been paid (pursuant to the amounts listed in the Employment Agreement) and the
amounts that she actually was paid. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 33 and 34).
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73.

In total, Cybertary failed to pay Beckman $235,041.05 in wages and

benefits that were owed under the Employment Agreement. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 33 and
34).
Facts relating to attorney's fees
74.

In the event of litigation, the Employment Agreement contains an

attorney's fees provision which provides that the "non-prevailing party" (defined as the
party who recovers less than one-half of the amounts in dispute) is required to pay the
prevailing party's attorney's fees and court costs. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 1 at section 16).
75.

In her Amended Complaint, Beckman sought damages "in an amount to be

proven at trial which amount is currently unknown but believed to be in excess of
$300,000." (R. 11).
76.

At trial, Beckman sought an award of her unpaid salary and monthly

benefits, totaling $235,041.05. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 33; see also R. 1551 ).

~

77.

In its Counterclaim, Cybertary did not quantify its damages. (R. 19-32).

78.

On June 12, 2014, Cybertary served supplemental rule 26 disclosures

wherein it quantified its alleged damages as $373,500. (R. 1577).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

An incorrect instruction on the issue of "cause" for Beckman' s termination was
given to the jury. Without identifying any ambiguity, the District Court summarily
disregarded the plain language of the Employment Agreement and inserted its own
definition of "cause", which had the effect of nullifying the definition of "cause" set forth
in the Employment Agreement. The District Court relied on the definition of 'just cause"

22
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set forth in Uintah Basin, but unlike that case, the Employment Agreement at issue
contains a very specific definition of "cause".
The attorney's fees provision in the Employment Agreement allows for only one
"non-prevailing party". Again, the District Court disregarded the plain language of the
Employment Agreement and rewrote the fees provision in section 16. The District Court
incorrectly "bifurcated" the fees provision to allow both Beckman and Cybertary to be
~

the "non-prevailing party". Considering the plain language of the Employment
Agreement, along with the well-established common law rules interpreting similar
provisions, the District Court's "bifurcation~' of fees was entirely nonsensical. Beckman
was awarded over $103,063 in unpaid wages, Cybertary was awarded nothing, and
Cybertary was quite obviously the "non-prevailing party" as defined the Employment
Agreement.
The District Court also incorrectly awarded fees to Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer. As the plain language of Beckman's Amended Complaint makes clear, she did
not assert a claim against those two Appellees for breach of the Employment Agreement
for the simple reason that they were not parties to the Agreement. Beckman' s claim
against those two Appellees was predicated on a finding of willful misconduct or gross
negligence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807. Thus, her cause of action was
statutory, not contractual, and the reciprocal fees provision (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5826) did not serve as basis to award fees to Faulconer or Franchise Foundry.
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The District Court incorrectly excluded an entire 90-minute recorded phone call.
At no point during the call did Mr. Faulconer make an offer to settle a disputed claim,
and the recording is not 90 minutes of "compromise negotiations".
Beckman's damages in this action were measurable by facts and figures set forth
in the Employment Agreement, and her damages were fixed as of the date of her
unlawful termination (November 14, 2011). Thus, The District Court incorrectly denied
Beckman' s request for prejudgment interest.
Lastly, the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Beckman's motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint. Beckman' s delay in filing the motion was
justified by her bankruptcy, and the District Court identified nothing more than simple
prejudice. The correct standard for evaluating a motion for leave is whether the proposed
amendment would inflict unavoidable prejudice. The trial in this action did not occur
until over one year and seven months after Beckman' s motion for leave was filed.
Appellees would have had ample time to fairly adjudicate the issues in the proposed
amendment.
Beckman requests that the District Court be reversed, and that this case be

vj)

remanded for a new trial.
ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court's jury instructions stated the incorrect definition of
"cause" for termination.

To briefly summarize, Beckman's proposed instruction on "cause" for termination
was consistent with the definition of "cause" in the Employment Agreement (R. 1305-
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1306). The Appellees' proposed instruction added the definition of "just cause" set forth
in the Uintah Basin case. (R. 1399). The District Court selected Appellees' proposed
instruction and Beckman objected to the final instruction. (R. 1471-1494, 1853).

A.

The Employment Agreement defines "cause" for termination with no
ambiguity.

In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. Novell, Inc.

v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App 162, il 20, 92 P.3d 768. To determine the parties'
intent, Utah courts first examine the plain language in the four comers of the contract. If
the language is unambiguous, the parties' intent is determined from the contract's plain
meaning as a matter of law. Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. v. Overton, 2005 UT
App 257, ,I8, 116 P.3d 965. Ambiguity requires a showing that the contractual language
is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain "meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." Novell, supra, at ,I20.
Section 6(b) of the Employment Agreement defines "cause" by setting forth,
clearly and succinctly, seven circumstances that constitute "cause". In his letter of
November 14, 2011, Faulconer implicitly acknowledged that Cybertary needed "cause"
to terminate Beckman's employment when he stated that grounds for "cause" existed
under sections 6(b)(ii), (iii), and (vi) of the Employment Agreement. (See Pia. Tria. Ex.
19).
To deviate from the four comers of the Employment Agreement, The District
Court was required to first make a finding of ambiguity. It did not. Indeed, the Appellees
uid not even argue the "cause" definition was ambiguous. While Appellees argued that
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"people can disagree" what the seven items in the "cause" definition mean (R. 1853 at p.
4), simple "disagreement" is not enough to create ambiguity. See Plateau Mining Co. v.

Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P .2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (Simply because the
parties disagree on the meaning of a term in a contract does not make that term
ambiguous. To demonstrate ambiguity, "the contrary positions of the parties much each
be tenable."). A contract term may be imprecise, but it is not ambiguous if persons of
competent skill and knowledge are capable of understanding its plain meaning. R & R

Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997).
Furthermore, the Employment Agreement contains an integration clause which
states that the four corners of the Agreement (and its attachments) constitute "the entire
agreement between the parties". (Id. at section 12). With these factors in mind, the
District Court erroneously looked beyond the plain language of Employment Agreement
and inserted its own definition of what constitutes "cause" for termination.

B.

The Employment Agreement's definition of "cause" for termination
does not include "good faith business judgment".

In jury instruction 12, the District Court correctly included the Employment
Agreement's definition of "cause" for termination, and correctly stated that Cybertary
had to prove the existence of "cause" by a preponderance of the evidence. (R. 1481-82).
However, the District Court agreed with Appellees that the "just cause" definition from

Uintah Basin should be included. The District Court then added the following proviso to
Instruction 12:
"In determining whether Cybertary breached the Employment Agreement by
inaccurately determining that one or more of these definitions of "cause" existed,
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you must remember that the determination of whether one or more of these
conditions was satisfied was a matter for Cybertary 's good business judgment. So
long as Cybertary possessed a fair and honest cause or reason, in good faith, that
met one these definitions, cause existed to terminate Beckman, whether or not the
facts that Cybertary believed to be true really, in fact, were true." (R. 1481-1482)
(emphasis added).
The above-quoted portion of the instruction was incorrect. Section 6(b) of the
Employment Agreement does not contain the above language. The phrases "fair and
honest reason", "good faith", and "good business judgment" do not appear in section

~

6(b). Section 6(b) does not permit Cybertary to terminate Beckman solely because
Cybertary has a "good faith business judgment" that she engaged in "gross neglect",
"dereliction" of her duties, or any of the other six grounds listed. In other words, the
District Court rewrote section 6(b) to allow Cybertary to terminate Beckman based only
its own "good faith" and "good business judgment". This had the effect of nearly

~

transforming Beckman into an at-will employee. Courts should not rewrite contracts to
make better agreements than the parties made for themselves. See Bakowski v. Mountain

States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, ~ 19, 52 P.3d 1179.
Additionally, the District Court's inclusion of the above-quoted proviso
completely contradicts the preceding language in the instruction. The District Court
correctly stated- in the instruction that Cybertary had to prove "cause" existed by
preponderance of the evidence. However, in the very next breath, the District Court then
instructed the jury that all Cybertary had to do was exercise "good business judgment" in
"good faith". These two sections of the instruction are completely contradictory. If all
Cybertary had to do was exercise "good judgment" in "good faith", then Cybertary was
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relieved of any burden of proving "cause" existed by a preponderance of the evidence.
This contradiction produces an absurd result, 5 and from the plain language of the
Employment Agreement, Instruction 12 is not consistent with the parties' intent.

C.

Uintah Basin is inapplicable for the simple reason that the Employment
Agreement defines "cause".

Uintah Basin involved a doctor working for a medical center under a contract of

employment that did not have a specified term, but did have a provision that specified
termination could only occur for 'just cause". Uintah Basin, 2005 UT App. 92 at ,I2. The
agreement did not define "just cause" and did not otherwise clarify what grounds would
justify termination. Id. The Court confirmed that simply because the parties disagreed
about the meaning of 'just cause" did not make the meaning ambiguous. Id. at 114. The
Court then concluded that 'just cause" should be interpreted to have its "ordinary
meaning". Id. at 1115-16. 6
Unlike the employment contract in Uintah Basin, the Employment Agreement in
the present case specifically defines what "cause" for termination means. Again, under
section 6(b) of the Employment Agreement, "cause" included a detailed description of
seven particular circumstances: (i) committing a felony; (ii) willful breach, habitual

5

Courts should not interpret contracts in a manner that produces absurd results. See, e.g.
Avasthi & Associates, Inc. v. Banik, 343 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.]
201 l); Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267,271 (Minn. 2004);
Health Professionals, Ltd. v. Johnson, 339 Ill.App.3d 1021, l 036 (2003 ).
6

The Court stated 'just cause" is "widely understood to permit discharge only for 'a fair
and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith ... as opposed to one that is trivial,
capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual. '" Id., citing Guz v. Bechtel
Nat'!, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 8 P.3d 1089, 1100 (2000).
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neglect, gross neglect, or dereliction of duty; (iii) material misconduct; (iv) failure to
follow the Board's reasonable directions; (v) sexual harassment; (vi) conduct detrimental
to the company's reputation or operations; and (vii) breach of the agreement's restrictive
covenant regarding non-competition and non-solicitation. (See Pla. Trial Ex. 1 at section

~

6(b )). Thus, the parties specifically agreed what "cause" for termination meant. The
District Court incorrectly modified that definition, and the District Court's modification
rendered the definition to be meaningless.
Yet another distinction worthy of noting is that the employment agreement in
Uintah Basin did not have a specified term. The Employment Agreement in this case

~

does (three years). (See Pia. Trial Ex. 1 at p. 1). Thus further removes the Employm~nt
Agreement in this case from any logical comparison to the agreement in Uintah Basin.
Beckman is also compelled to note that the District Court's conclusion has
troubling ramifications. To affirm the District Court on this issue would mean that no
matter how an employer and employee define "cause" for the employee's termination,
the employer can take comfort in knowing that a reviewing court will simply disregard
that definition and insert the 'just cause" language from Uintah Basin. This cannot be
result intended by the Uintah Basin Court.
The District Court incorrectly rejected Beckman's proposed instruction, and
incorrectly overruled Beckman's objection to the final instruction. The District Court
should be reversed.

D.

The incorrect jury instruction was prejudicial and warrants a new
trial.
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For an incorrect jury instruction to warrant a new trial, the instruction must tend to
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party, or erroneously advise the jury
on the law. Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 8 P.3d 281,284 (Utah App. 2000); Vitale v.
v,

Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah App. 1996). As set forth above, the Uintah
Basin definition of ''just cause" effectively relieved Cybertary of its burden of proving

"cause" existed under section 6 of the Employment Agreement, and instead advised the
t/i}

jury that all Cybertary had to prove was that it exercised "good business judgment" in
"good faith". (R. 1481-1482). The instruction was not only an incorrect statement of the
law, it misled the jury and inflicted prejudice on Beckman. Cybertary's burden of proving
that it exercised "good judgment" in "good faith" is a much lower burden than proving
the existence-by a preponderance of the evidence-of one of the circumstances
amounting to "cause" in section 6(b) of the Employment Agreement. The Appellees
would not have insisted on including the Uin.tah Basin definition of ''just cause" if it did
not drastically alter their burden of proof.
Instruction 12 was incorrect and prejudicial. This case should be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
II.

The District Court incorrectly awarded attorney's fees to Cybertary.

After the jury returned its verdict, the parties filed cross-motions for attorney's
(.j

fees, and the parties relied on section 16 of the Employment Agreement:

~

~

"16. Prevailing Party; Costs. The nonprevailing party in any proceeding
hereunder shall be the party that the court of competent jurisdiction awards less
than one-half ( 1/2) of all of the amounts in dispute ("Nonprevailing Party"). The
Nonprevailing Party to any proceeding under this Agreement shall pay its own
expenses, the court fees, and any administrative fees arising in connection
30 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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therewith, and the expenses, including without limitation, attorneys' fees, costs,
and costs of investigation, reasonably incurred by the other party to the
proceeding."
Appellees argued that section 16 should be "bifurcated" to enable each party's
claim to be evaluated discretely. (R. 1706, R. 1854 at p. 19). Appellees further argued

~

that Beckman asserted her first claim (breach of the Employment Agreement) against
Franchise Foundry and Faulconer, and therefore, under the reciprocal fees statute (Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-5-826), Franchise Foundry and Faulconer were entitled to their fees.
The District Court agreed. (R. 1819-1823).
None of the language in section 16 is ambiguous, Appellees did not argue that
ambiguity exists, and the District Court did not find any ambiguity. Again, Courts must
derive the parties' intent from the plain meaning of the agreement, and consider each
contractual provision in relation to the other provisions "with an eye toward giving effect
to_ all provisions and ignoring none." Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Dept. of
Transp., 2011 UT 35, ,r27, 266 P.3d 671. "If the legal right to attorney fees is established
by contract, Utah law clearly requires the court to apply the contractual attorney fee
provision and to do so strictly in accordance with the contract's terms." Jones v. Riche,
2009 UT App 196, ,r2, 216 P.3d 357.
Whether attorney's fees are recoverable is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Chase, 2001 UT App 404 at ,rs. The interpretation of a contract is a question
oflaw, which is also reviewed for correctness. Big Ditch Irr., 258 P.3d at 544.
A.

The fees provision in the Employment Agreement does not permit
more than one "nonprevailing party".
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The plain language of section 16 states fees are paid by the "non-prevailing party".
The term "nonprevailing party" is singular. If the parties had intended there be more than
one "nonprevailing party" in litigation, the parties would have used the term "nonprevailing parties" (plural). Where a contract contains a fees provision that awards fees to
a "prevailing party", there can be only one prevailing party. Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah App. 1989). This is true even
where both parties are awarded money damages on claims arising from the same
transaction. Id. at 556. In concluding that the both Cybertary and Beckman were the
vj

"nonprevailing party", the District Court incorrectly departed from the plain meaning of
section 16 and essentially re-wrote that provision. This conclusion was incorrect and
must be reversed.

B.

The fees provision refers to "all amounts in dispute".

The plain language of section 16 defines the "non-prevailing party" as "the party
that the court of competent jurisdiction awards less than one-half (1/2) of all of the
amounts in dispute." (emphasis added). The phrase "all of the amounts in dispute" is
simple, clear, direct, and unambiguous. "All amounts" (plural) means those amounts
sought in the "dispute" (singular).
The District Court departed from this plain meaning and "bifurcated" the fees
provision. Section 16 does not permit "bifurcation" and it does not state that each party's
damages are evaluated discretely. The word "bifurcate" does not appear in section 16.
~

Instead, section 16 groups "all amounts in dispute" together and then assigns liability to
the one party who is awarded less than one-half of those amounts.
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C.

Cybertary was the sole "nonprevailing party".
Cybertary sought $373,500 in damages and injunctive relief.

Cybertary sought a permanent injunction against Beckman. (R. 22). Its request for
an injunction was dismissed. (R. 1820). In its supplemental disclosures, Cybertary

~

quantified the damages it was seeking in connection with its counterclaims (against
Beckman) as $373,500. (R. 1577). Cybertary was not awarded any damages.
Cybertary then argued it did not put any "amounts in dispute" because ·of
Beckman's successful objection to Cybertary's untimely damages calculation. (See R.
1459). Cybertary's noncompliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 26 does not change history.
Cybertary quantified its damages as $373,500, it did not voluntarily dismiss its
counterclaims, and it continued pursuing those counterclaims until the final day of trial.
2.

Beckman sought $235,041.05 damages.

At trial, Beckman sought an award of her unpaid salary and monthly benefits,
totaling $235,041.05. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 33; see also R. 1551 ).
3.

The total of the "amounts in dispute".

To calculate the "amounts in dispute"-for purposes of section 16 of the
Employment Agreement-the District Court should have subtracted what Beckman
sought ($235,041.05) from what Cybertary sought ($373,500) to arrive at $138,458.95.
The jury awarded Cybertary nothing. Thus, Cybertary is the "nonprevailing party" as
defined section 16.
4.

Beckman is the prevailing party under the net judgment rule.
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Beckman emphasizes that there is no need to depart from the plain meaning of
section 16 of the Employment Agreement. For completeness, Beckman cites two
common law principles-the net judgment rule and the comparative victory rule-to
further support the conclusion that the she was the prevailing party.
In Mountain States, the "starting point" for examining who was the prevailing
party was the "net judgment rule": "[T]he party in whose favor the 'net' judgment is
entered must be considered the 'prevailing party' and is entitled to an award of its fees."

ld. 7
Turning to the present case, the jury awarded Ms. Beckman $103,063.83 in
damages. Cybertary was not awarded any damages. Under the net judgment rule,
Beckman is the prevailing party and Cybertary is the nonprevailing party.
5.

Beckman is the prevailing party under the comparative victory
rule.

The Mountain States court also discussed the "comparative victory" analysis. Id.
at 558. The court noted that "total victory" for the appellant would have been $30,000,
and "total victory" for the appellee would have been proving the appellant was entitled to
nothing. Id. The final judgment awarded only $6,000 to appellant. Id. Accordingly, under
the comparative victory approach, the appellee was correctly awarded its fees. Id.
In the case at bar, total victory for Beckman would have been $235,041. Total
victory for Cybertary would have been $373,500 and an injunction against Beckman. A
7

On petition for re-hearing, this Court noted that in determining who is the prevailing
party, "a flexible and reasoned approach" is needed. Id. at 557. Thus, the net judgment
rule should not always be applied "mechanically", but "it will be at least a good starting
point." Id.
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"draw" would have been $138,458.95 awarded to Cybertary. Again, the jury awarded
$103,063.83 to Beckman and nothing to Cybertary, and Cybertary's request for an
injunction was dismissed. Under the comparative victory approach (indeed, under any
approach), Beckman is the prevailing party and Cybertary is the nonprevailing party.

III.

The District Court incorrectly awarded attorney's fees to Franchise Foundry
and Faulconer.

A.

Franchise Foundry and Faulconer were not parties to the Employment
Agreement, and Beckman did not assert that they breached that
agreement.

In the proceedings below, Appellees' counsel created the proverbial "straw man"
by arguing that Beckman's claim for breach of the Employment Agreement was asserted
against all three Appellees. Beckman most certainly did not assert her claim for breach of
the Employment Agreement against all three Appellees, and the plain language of her
Amended Complaint supports that conclusion.
There are two parties to the Employment Agreement: Cybertary (employer) and
Beckman (employee). (See Pia. Trial Ex. 1, p. 1). Neither Franchise Foundry nor
Faulconer are parties to the Employment Agreement. In her Amended Complaint,
Beckman brought a cause action against Cybertary for breach of the Employment
Agreement. In her first claim for relief, Beckman alleged:
"24. Cybertary has materially breached the Employment Agreement by failing
to pay Beckman her base salary and benefits." (R. 13) (emphasis added)
"26. Cybertary has further breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the Employment Agreement." {Id.) (emphasis added).
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In arguing that Beckman brought her first claim for relief against Franchise
Foundry and Faulconer, Appellees relied on ,I27 of the Amended Complaint:
"27. In retaliation for filing this lawsuit, Faulconer and Franchise Foundry have
attempted on behalf of Cybertary to terminate Beckman as Chief Executive
Officer for Cybertary. Faulconer and Franchise Foundry have interfered with
Beckman's abilities to perform her duties as Chief Executive Officer of Cybertary.
Such retaliation and actions on behalf of Cybertary further constitute a material
breach of the Employment Agreement." (R. 13) (emphasis added)
As the above paragraph demonstrates, the factual allegations in ,I2 7 pertain to
actions taken "on behalf of Cybertary."
Appellees also cited the "Prayer for Relief' in the Amended Complaint, wherein
Beckman's previous counsel stated, "On her First Claim for Relief, for a money
judgment against Cybertary, Franchise Foundry and Faulconer in an amount to be proven
at trial." R. 11 ).
While the Amended Complaint may have been poorly drafted, it most certainly
did not allege that Franchise Foundry and Faulconer breached an agreement they were
not parties to. As set forth, infra, Beckman's claim against Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer was for declaratory relief that they acted with willful misconduct and/or gross
negligence, enabling Beckman to hold them personally liable for her damages pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807. While Beckman's "Prayer for Relief' unquestionably
states that Franchise Foundry and Faulconer should held liable for Beckman 's damages,
it does not state that their liability arises out of a breach of the Employment Agreement.
Appellees further cited the summary judgment order, which states:
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"The Court GRANTS Defendants' Cross-Motion insofar as it seeks summary
judgment on behalf of Franchise Foundry and Faulconer on Beckman's First
Claim for Relief, for breach of the Employment Agreement." (R. 897-898). 8
During the summary judgment proceedings, both in his written memoranda and
during oral argument, Beckman' s counsel made it perfectly clear that Beckman' s first

~

cause of action was never asserted against Franchise Foundry or Faulconer. (R. 683, 1851
at p. 35).
Beckman' s first claim, for breach of the Employment Agreement, was never
asserted against Faulconer or Franchise Foundry.

B.

Beckman 's claim against Franchise Foundry and Faulconer was for
statutory liability pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-807.

The parties (and the District Court) acknowledged that Beckman's third claim for
relief (for declaratory judgment, R. 11-12) included an assertion that Faulconer (as a
manager of Cybertary) and Franchise Foundry (as a member of Cybertary) acted with
"gross negligence" or "willful misconduct", resulting in liability under Utah Code Ann. §
48-2c-807. Beckman's proposed jury instructions (1370-1371, 1381) and Appellees'
objection to those instructions (R. 1401-1402) both confirmed that willful misconduct or
gross negligence was a prerequisite to liability for Franchise Foundry and Faulconer. The
Court's final jury instructions stated that any liability for Faulconer and Franchise
4

Foundry required a showing of willful misconduct or gross negligence. (See Instructions
19-21, R. 1472-1474). Accordingly, Beckman's claim against Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer was unquestionably one of statutory liability, not contractual. Thus, the

8

Beckman's counsel approved this Order as to form only and not as to content. (R. 897).
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reciprocal fees prov1s1on m Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-286 had no applicability to
Beckman's claim against Faulconer and Franchise Foundry.

C.

The District Court incorrectly relied on Bilanzich and Hooban.

In the dispute over attorney's fees, Franchise Foundry and Faulconer argued that
they were entitled to fees pursuant to the reasoning from Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT
26, 160 P.3d 1041 and Hooban v. Unicity Intern., Inc., 2009 UT App 287, 220 P.3d 485
(using a contract as a basis for recovery under the reciprocal fees provision, Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-5-286). The District Court obviously found these cases to be applicable and
persuasive. The opposite is true.

Bilanzich has zero applicability to this case. In Bilanzich, a party to an
unenforceable guaranty asked the court to enforce the fees provision in that guaranty. In
reversing the District Court, the Utah Supreme Court noted that Utah Code Ann. § 78-2756.5 (what is now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-286) does not require the contract
to be enforceable in order for a party to invoke the attorney's fees provision. Bilanzich,
2007 UT 26, ,I23. Unlike the plaintiff in Bilanzich, neither Faulconer nor Franchise
vi)

Foundry sought damages (against Beckman) arising out of a contract that they were
parties to. Unlike Bilanzich, the relevant issue in the present case is not the enforceability
of the agreement in relation to the fees provision. Instead, the relevant issue is whether
Beckman brought a cause of action against Franchise Foundry and Faulconer for
breaching the Employment Agreement. As set forth, supra, she quite clearly did not.

Hooban is admittedly a closer call, but it is likewise inapplicable. In Hooban, a
prospective buyer of stocks brought an action against a corporation "as if he were a party
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to the Contract, attempting to enforce the Contract and even seeking attorney fees under
its provisions." Hooban, 2009 UT App 287, ,rIO. The Court awarded the corporation its

~

fees under Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-286. Jd.
Returning the present case, again, Beckman did not bring a cause of action against

~

Franchise Foundry and/or Faulconer for breaching the Employment Agreement; she did
not sue those two Appellees as if they were parties to the Employment Agreement. Thus,
the District Court incorrectly concluded that Franchise Foundry and Faulconer could
invoke the fees provision in the Employment Agreement as a basis for their attorney's
fees ..

D.

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826 is discretionary, and the District Court
abused its discretion by awarding fees to Faulconer and Franchise
Foundry.
~

Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-826, awarding fees is
discretionary. Bilanzich, supra, at ,II 7. The underlying pmyose of Utah Code Ann. §
788-5-826 is create a level playing field where one party does not have unequal exposure
to risk for incurring fees. Id. at ,r,r I 8-19. With policy in mind, the District Court abused its
discretion. Had Beckman prevailed on her claim against Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer, she could not have invoked Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-286 as a basis to recover
her fees from those two Appellees. (Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-286 does not provide fees
in connection with Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807). Thus, reciprocally, Franchise Foundry
and Faulconer cannot use Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-286 as a basis to recover fees from
Beckman. This is precisely the type of unequal exposure that should be avoided under
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826. The District Court should be reversed.
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IV.

The District Court incorrectly denied Beckman's request for prejudgment
interest.

The District Court denied Beckman 's request for prejudgment interest on the
grounds that "Beckman's damages are not the type of damages that are susceptible to an
award of prejudgment interest." (R. 1820). In reaching this conclusion, the District
disregarded the controlling standard for prejudgment interest. A decision to grant or deny
~

prejudgment interest presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Saleh,
2006 UT 20, ,I28.
Prejudgment interest compensates a party for the "depreciating value of the
amount owed over time, and as a corollary, deters parties from intentionally withholding
an amount that is liquidated and owing." Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State

Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 1996). Prejudgment interest may be
recovered where "the damage is complete, the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular
time, and the loss is measurable by facts and figures." Saleh, 2006 UT 20, ,r28. The
interest begins to run from the date the damages are complete to the date of the final
judgment. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 20 I, ,I64, 71 P.3d 188.
In Kraatz, the aggrieved employee was awarded prejudgment interest on his
unpaid salary, the value of his unpaid stock appreciati~n, his unpaid profit-sharing
viP

bonuses, his 40 I (k) contributions, Christmas bonuses, and even his Utah Jazz basketball
tickets. Id. at ,r,r62- 73. This Court concluded that monetary amounts for all those items
were measurable by facts and figures, making prejudgment interest appropriate. Id.

40
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In contrast, prejudgment interest may not be awarded where the damages are
incomplete or incalculable, such as personal injury, pain and suffering, wrongful death,

~

defamation, and false imprisonment. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P .2d 414, 422
(Utah 1989); Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).
A.

Beckman's damages are quantified in the Employment Agreement.

Section 3 of the Employment Agreement specifically states how much Beckman
should have been paid in base salary and monthly benefits allowance. (See Pia. Trial Ex.
1 at section 3). The agreement further specifies when Beckman's salary is due: on the
15th day and the last day of each month. {Id.) Simply stated, Beckman's wages and
monthly benefits can be measured and quantified by the amounts listed in the
Employment Agreement.
At trial, Beckman presented a precise calculation of the amounts she should have
been paid (pursuant to the _amounts listed in the Employment Agreement) and the
amounts that she actually was paid. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 33 and 34). The jury awarded Ms.
Beckman $84,913.83 in unpaid salary and $18,150 in unpaid benefits, for a total of
$103,063.83. (R. 1502). Thus, the obvious conclusion is that Beckman's damages were
measurable and quantifiable by facts and figures.
B.

Beckman's damages were fixed as of November 14, 2011.

Cybertary terminated Beckman's employment on November 14, 2011. (See Pia.
Trial Ex. I 9). Due to the erroneous instruction on "cause", the jury determined that
Cybertary had "cause" to terminate Beckman' s employment. Thus, Beckman' s damages
were fixed and complete as of the date of her termination (November 14, 2011).
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With Beckman's damages easily quantified and fixed as to a particular time, the
District Court incorrectly denied Beckman 's request for prejudgment interest. If a new
trial is not granted, at a minimum, the District Court's ruling on prejudgment interest
should be reversed and prejudgment interest should be awarded in accordance with Utah
Code Ann.§ 15-1-1.

V.

The District Court incorrectly concluded that the recorded phone call from
October 19, 2011 was inadmissible pursuant to Utah. R. Evid. 408.
By October 2011, after 14 months of working extremely hard while receiving

minimal compensation, and after enduring Franchise Foundry's expensive yet criminally
ineffective performance, Beckman' s patience had been exhausted. Her previous counsel
sent a demand letter for her unpaid wages on October 11, 2011. (R. 1195-96). On
October 19, 2011 (roughly two weeks before Beckman filed this case), Beckman and
Faulconer had a 90-minute, recorded phone conversation. (R. 1023-1030; see also, MP3
audio on the disc submitted with this brief). Before trial, the Appellees filed a motion a
limine to exclude the audio recording in its entirety on the grounds that it was
inadmissible "settlement negotiations" pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 408. (R. 1028). With no
analysis or explanation, the District Court agreed and concluded that the audio recording
(all 90 minutes of it) was "compromise negotiations" inadmissible pursuant to Utah R.
~

Evid. 408. (R. 1469). The District Court's conclusion was incorrect and should be
reversed.
Generally, Utah R. Evid. 408 excludes evidence of settlement offers and
"compromise negotiations" to prove liability. Under subsection (b), a court is not
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required to exclude "evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in
the course of compromise negotiations." Utah R. Evid. 408(b).
Utah's version of Rule 408 has no substantive difference from and is nearly
identical to Fed. R. Evid. 408. Where there is little case law interpreting a Utah rule and
the rule is identical to the corresponding federal rule, Utah courts freely look to the
federal rule as a useful guide. Oakwood Viii., LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226 at
n. l (Utah 2004 ). By its plain terms, Rule 408 protects only "conduct or statements made
in compromise negotiations regarding a claim that was disputed as to validity or amount."
Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 608 F.3d 284, 296 (5th Cir. 20 l 0).

A.

Beckman intended to use Faucloner's statements in the call to prove
she was owed her wages and that Faulconer and/or Franchise Foundry
acted with willful misconduct.

Near the beginning of the call, Faulconer announced that the "whole conversation
is for settlement purposes only." (Recording at 0:53). Appellees argued that this simple
disclaimer magically immunized the entire 90-minute call as inadmissible "settlement
negotiations". The District Court agreed.
During the call, Faulconer repeatedly admitted that Cybertary owes Beckman
wages. (Recording at 34:30, 43:55, I :09:00, I: 17:20).9 He further admitted that Beckman
was "owed more than the company has" (Id. at 34:30), that she could not and should not
work for free (Id. at 43 :30, 44:30), and that the only way for Cybertary to pay Beckman is
her wages is to "put together a plan for profitability". (Id. at 54:45). Faulconer also

9

All of the statements from the recording cited in this brief are also cited in Beckman's
opposition to the motion in limine. (R. 1165).
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admitted that if and how Beckman gets paid is subject to his approval {Id. at 44:50), and
that Cybertary had no intent of terminating Beckman' s employment. (Id. at 12 :30, 21: 10,
30:20, 30:45, 42:55, 1:23:35). These statements were all relevant to Beckman's claims,
and were relevant to disproving Cybertary' s claim that Beckman "waived" her right to
her wages and benefits. These statements also would have heavily damaged Faulconer's
credibility.
B.

No dispute existed at the time of the phone call.

By its plain language, Utah R. Evid. 408(a) excludes communications to prove
liability for a "disputed claim". Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998); Dallis v.
Aetna life Ins. Co., 768 F.2d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 1985). During the call, not once did

Faulconer ever dispute that Beckman was owed her wages. As set forth above, he
repeatedly admitted that Beckman was owed her wages. The Appellees have emphasized
that nine days before the call, they received a demand letter from Beckman' s counsel. (R.
1195-96). However, the call also occurred 14 days before Beckman filed her lawsuit and
26 days before Faulconer sent the termination letter. (Pia. Trial Ex. 19). The call occurred
before Beckman realized that Faulconer planned on terminating her employment for false
and baseless reasons and before she realized Cybertary was going to assert the argument
that she had waived her right to her wages. Simply stated, there was "dispute" at the time
of the call and Rule 408 does not cloak to the entire 90-minute call.

C.

Faulconer never made a settlement offer.
44 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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To fall within the protection of Utah R. Evid. 408(a)(l), the statement must be an
offer of "valuable consideration" in attempt to compromise the disputed claim. See Child,
972 P .2d at 429. At oral arguments before the District Court, Appellees emphasized that
Faulconer offered an "interim" and "good faith token payment of $2,000 to Beckman
(1:23:50, 1:28:15). However, as the recording makes it clear, neither Faulconer nor
Beckman interpreted "one week's pay" or a "token" payment of $2,000 to be an offer to

~

settle Beckman's entire claim for what was in excess of $200,000. Because Faulconer
never made a settlement offer, Utah R. Evid. 408(a)(l) does not immunize any portion of
the call.
D.

The recording is not 90 minutes of "compromise negotiations".

Rule 408(a)(2) makes "compromise negotiations' inadmissible. See, e.g. Anderson

v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, ,I28, 176 P.3d 464. The Tenth Circuit has distinguished
between "compromise negotiations" that fall within the safe harbor of Rule 408 and
"business communications" that do not. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1373 (10th Cir. 1977) (communications before litigation had
been filed regarding a trademark dispute were considered admissible business
negotiations). The Ninth Circuit has held that an employer's attempt to condition a
severance package upon the settlement and release of claims not yet asserted was not
"compromise negotiations" under Rule 408. Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817
F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit shrewdly noted that the employee
had not asserted any claims at the time the severance Was offered and "Rule 408 should
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not be used to bar relevant evidence concerning the circumstances of the termination
itself simply because one party calls its communication with the other party a 'settlement
offer."' Id. at 1343.
The 90-minute phone call can reasonably summarized as: (1) Faulconer's
assurances that he had no intent to purchase Beckman's ownership in Cybertary from the
bankruptcy trustee, (2) Faulconer's assurances that Cybertary has no intention of
terminating Beckman's employment and was not searching for "cause" to terminate her
employment; (3) Faulconer's repeated affirmations that Cybertary owes Beckman wages;
(4) the parties' agreement that Beckman could not continue working without getting paid
her wages; (5) if and how Beckman gets paid is subject to Faulconer's approval; (6) a
discussion of a potential "plan for profitability"; (7) Franchise Foundry should be
completing more sales, even with "crappy leads", and (8) discussions of a "good faith
token" payment to Beckman. (R. 1160-1161).
The above subject matter is not "compromise negotiations" or an attempt to settle
Beckman' s claim for over $200,000 in unpaid salary and benefits. The phone call was
business communications that do not fall within the scope of Rule 408. Furthermore,
Beckman emphasizes the obvious fact that by recording the call, she intended to use that
recording at a later date, either in litigation or to contradict Faulconer's assertions. She
did not record the call with intent that it would be deemed inadmissible in a court
proceeding.

46
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E.

In the alternative, the exception set forth in Utah R. Evid. 408(b)(2)
would apply.

Utah R. Evid. 408(b)(2) states: "The court is not required to exclude evidence
othetwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations." Rule 408 is not an absolute bar on all evidence regarding settlement
negotiations, and it does not permit a party to shield relevant evidence from admissibility
merely because it was discussed in a settlement negotiation. See Bankcard Am., Inc. v.

Universal Bancard Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 477, 484 (7th Cir. 2000). Rule 408 "does not
permit a party to shield relevant evidence from admissibility merely because it was
discussed in a settlement negotiation." Agan v. Katzman & Korr, P.A., 328 F.Supp.2d
1363, 1370 (S.D.Fla. 2004).
For reasons previously set forth, the recording contains multiple statements from

~

Faulconer that are relevant to the claims and defenses presented in this case. Even if one
or two isolated statements in the call could be classified as "compromise negotiations",

~

such statements do not immunize the entire 90 minute phone call.
The District Court's interpretation and application of Utah R. Evid. 408 was
incorrect, and the District Court abused its discretion when it excluded the recording.

F.

The District Court's exclusion of the recording was -prejudicial and
warrants reversal.

Even if the trial court's conclusion was incorrect, reversal is appropriate only if
"'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been
reached." Utah Dept. of Transp., 872 P.2d at 465. In contrast, an error is harmless if it is
"sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected
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the outcome of the proceedings." Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., Inc.,
830 P.2d 291, 293-94 (Utah App. 1992). In those cases where the court cannot, "with any
degree of assurance, affirm that the use of such evidence would not have been helpful to
the plaintiff, the doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing him to have a full and fair
presentation of his case to the jury." Id. If an error was prejudicial, reversal and remand
for a new trial is appropriate. Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84, ,rI 0, 158 P .3d 552.

1.

The exclusion of the recording was prejudicial to the
determination of gross negligence and/or willful misconduct.

The jury concluded that neither Faulconer nor Franchise Foundry acted with gross
negligence or willful misconduct. (R. 1496-97). Had the jury heard the recorded phone
call, they likely would have reached the opposite conclusion.
To briefly review, Beckman sought to hold Faulconer (as a manager of Cybertary)
and Franchise Foundry (as a member of Cybertary) liable on the grounds that the failure
to pay Beckman' s wages was "willful misconduct" or "gross negligence" pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807. Jury instruction number 20 defined "gross negligence" as,
"a failure to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that
shows utter indifference to the consequences." (R. 1473). Jury instruction number 21
defined willful misconduct:
~

"This requires Beckman to prove that Franchise Foundry and/or Faulconer acted
not only wrongly, but that they did so acted intentionally, with knowledge that
serious injury to Beckman would be the probable result. Put differently, willful
misconduct is one step beyond gross negligence, and it means such gross neglect
of duty as to evince a reckless indifference of Beckman's rights, and an entire
want of care so as to raise the presumption that Franchise Foundry and/or
Faulconer were conscious of the consequences of their carelessness." (R. 1472)
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Had the jury heard the recording, the jury would have heard evidence that
Faulconer admitted Beckman did not waive her right to her wages, that Faulconer was
willfully withholding Beckman' s wages and conditioning payment of her wages on a
"plan for profitability", and that Cybertary did not have cause to terminate Beckman' s

~

employment. Meanwhile, Faulconer and Franchise Foundry exerted control over
Cybertary's finances and diverted payments totaling $265,751 to Franchise Foundry. (See
Pia. Trial Ex. 34). Additionally, Faulconer conditioning payment of Beckman's wages on
Cybertary's "profitability"-a condition that conveniently did not apply to Franchise
Foundry-is nowhere to be found in the Employment Agreement. Under section 3 of the

~

Agreement, Beckman's wages _are not contingent on "profitability". This scheming and
nauseating course of conduct would have been corroborated by the recording, and likely
would have persuaded the jury that Franchise Foundry and/or Faulconer acted with
willful misconduct or gross negligence.
2.

The exclusion of the recording was prejudicial to
determination of "cause" for termination.

the

The jury concluded that Cybertary did not breach the Employment Agreement by
terminating Beckman without "cause". (R. 1497). Had the jury heard the recorded phone
call, they likely would have reached the opposite conclusion.
As noted above, in the recording, Faulconer unambiguously and repeatedly
declared that Cybertary had no intent of terminating Beckman's employment. (Recording
at 12:30, 21 :08, 30:20, 30:45, 42:55, and I :23:35). Faulconer further admitted, "We have
an obligation to [Beckman] we have to pay. . . We have an ongoing obligation to
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[Beckman] we need to continue to meet." (Recording at 1: 10:30). Had the jury heard
these remarks, made less than two weeks before the case was filed and less than one
month before the termination decision was made, the jury likely would have concluded
that Cybertary had no "cause" for Beckman' s termination. This was also prejudicial to
Beckman because jury instruction number 19 stated that the jury could not find that
Faulconer and Franchise Foundry acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct
unless they first found that no "cause" existed for Beckman's termination. (R. 1474).
Accordingly, the District Court's exclusion of the recording was an incorrect
application of Utah R. 408, an abuse of discretion, and prejudicial to the outcome of this
case. This Court should reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
~

VI.

The District Court abused its discretion when it denied Beckman 's motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint.
The District Court denied Beckman' s motion for leave on the grounds that it was

untimely, the product of unreasonable delay, and it would be prejudicial to the Appellees.
(R. 352). In so concluding, the District Court abused its discretion. 10
Leave to file an amended pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires."
Utah R. Civ. P. 15. Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments "to the end that
cases may be fully and fairly presented on their merits." Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P. ~d

1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). This approach is consistent with the "fundamental purpose of
10

To show an abuse of discretion, the appellant must show that the trial court exceeded
the measure of discretion by showing that the decision exceeds the limits of
reasonableness, or by showing that the decision is arbitrary and capricious. See State v.
Brink, 2007 UT App 353, iJ 4, 173 P.3d 183; Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, iJ 32, 9
P.3d 171; Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2007 UT App 336, iJ 6, 171 P.3d
474.
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liberalizing both pleadings and procedure to the end that parties are afforded the privilege
of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute."
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963). Under the federal standard-which is
analogous to the standard in Utah R. Civ. P. 15-if the proposed amendment presents "a
proper subject of relief, the plaintiff "ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim
on the merits." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In the absence of undue delay,
bad faith, or other prejudice to the opposing party, "the leave sought should, as the rules
require, be 'freely given."' Id.
In considering a motion for leave to file an amended pleading, Utah courts
generally consider three factors: ( l) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for
the delay; and (3) the prejudice to the adverse party. Berkshires, LLC v. Sykes, 127 P.3d
1243, 1249 (Utah App. 2005).
A.

The motion for leave was timely.

No bright-line rule establishes what is timely and what is not. However, two
general principles have emerged: First, motions for leave are untimely if they are filed in
the "advanced procedural stages" of litigation. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969
P.2d 403, 408-09 (Utah 1998) (motion for leave filed after two continuances of the trial
date and only 45 days before trial was untimely); Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 922
(Utah 1994) (motion for leave filed one month after summary judgment was untimely).
And second, motions for leave are untimely if they are filed several years into the
litigation. Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, 2003 UT App. 411, iJ19, 82 P.3d 198
(motion for leave filed twelve years into the case was untimely); Hill v. State Farm Mut.
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Auto Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah App. 1992) (motion for leave filed six years into

the case was untimely).
Beckman's complaint was filed on November 2, 2011. (R. 1-5). Her amended
complaint (filed before any responsive pleading) was filed November 21, 2011. (R. 1017). With new counsel, Beckman' s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint
was filed on March 15, 2013 (R. 166-191 ). The time period between the date of the
original complaint and the date Beckman sought leave is one year, four months, and 13
days. This time period is not, as a matter of law, untimely, and it is not by itself
dispositive on the issue of whether leave to amend was properly denied.
Turning to the procedural stage inquiry, the fact discovery cutoff date was
September 6, 2012. 11 This case logically could not progress until the motion to dismissfiled by Franchise Foundry and Faulconer-was denied on May 29, 2012 (R. 147), and
until after the Appellees filed their answer on June 18, 2012 (R. 157). That left less than
three months to conduct any discovery and the Appellees did not bother to serve their
Rule 26 disclosures until November 9, 2012 (two months after fact discovery closed).
Thus, the time period at issue must factor in the delays precipitated by the Appellees.

~

B.

Beckman's delay was justified by her bankruptcy.

11

Under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c)(5), as a tier 3 case, the calculation is as follows:
Cybertary's answer was filed December 29, 2011. (R. 40). Cybertary's rule 26
disclosures were due 42 days later, on February 9, 2012. 210 days from that date is
September 6, 2012.
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The 'justification" prong has evolved to more closely resemble the federal
standard for amended pleadings. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44,

Giii

,I,I32-38, 87 P.3d 734. This approach frames the issue as whether the delay in filing the
motion was based on bad faith or a dilatory motive. Id. iJ37. Beckman's delay was
justified. After Appellees withheld her wages and refused to service her debts, Beckman
had no alternative but to file bankruptcy on May 20, 2012. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 50). Ms.
Beckman's previous counsel withdrew from the case four days later. (R. 141).
The bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. '§ 541(a)(l). This includes the

~

debtor's interest in a cause of action in litigation. Kollar v. Miller, 176 F.3d 175, 178 (3d
Cir. 1999); In re Resorts Intern., Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 157 (3rd Cir. 2004). Accordingly,
the bankruptcy estate included Beckman' s interest in this litigation and moving forward
with new and plausible c_laims for relief would have increased the likelihood that the
trustee would have seized those claims and listed them in her final report. In this context,
Beckman's fear that the trustee would seize her claims in this case was perfectly
legitimate. By March 15, 2013 (the date Beckman filed her motion for leave), although
no final decree had been rendered by the bankruptcy court, the trustee's final report did
not include Beckman' s claims and her counsel decided that they could not wait any
longer.
Beckman's bankruptcy is neither bad faith nor a dilatory motive. To the contrary:
her bankruptcy was a direct result of the Appellees' conduct. For the Appellees to
withhold Beckman' s wages, drive her into bankruptcy, and then complain about the
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delays associated with her bankruptcy only reinforces the Appellees' willful (and
deplorable) misconduct. In sum, the specter of losing Beckman' s claims in this case to
the bankruptcy trustee presents a justification for the delay in seeking leave to amend.
C.

Appellees would not have suffered unavoidable prejudice.

A trial court must consider whether the adverse party would be subject to
"unavoidable prejudice" by having insufficient time to prepare for the adjudication of an
issue. Fishbaugh, 969 P.2d at 408-09. "Simple prejudice is not enough to support a denial
of a motion to amend." Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 at ,I3 l. The prejudice must rise to the
~

level where it is "unavoidable" and deprives the adverse party of time to prepare to
adjudicate issue. Id. The simple fact that an amended pleading may require a defendant to
conduct additional discovery is not enough; the inquiry must focus on whether the
defendant has a "fair opportunity to litigate" the issues raised in the amended pleading.
Id. at ,I3 l, citing 61 A Am.Jur.2d Pleading § 776.

In the case at bar, the District Court's order denying Beckman's motion references
only simple prejudice-that is, the District Court provided no explanation or description
of the alleged "prejudice" Appellees would have suffered. Even without Beckman's
second amended complaint, the trial in this action did not take place until one year and
seven months after she fiied her motion, which would have been ample time to adjudicate
the issues raised in Beckman' s second amended complaint.
The simple prejudice identified by the District Court was an unreasonable basis to
deny Beckman's motion for leave. The District Court's refusal to grant Beckman leave
was unreasonable, contrary to the applicable standard for leave to amend, and was an

liiP
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abuse of discretion. The order denying Beckman's motion for leave should be reversed
and this case should be remanded for a full adjudication of the issues raised in Beckman's
second amended complaint.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Beckman respectfully requests that the District Court be
reversed on all issues presented for review herein, that the final judgments in this action
be vacated, and that this case be remanded for a new trial. Beckman also requests an
award of her fees and costs incurred in this appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 34 and
section 16 of the Employment Agreement.

Respectfully Submitted on this the 23rd day of September, 2015.

STAVROS LAW, P.C.

n
ppellant Patricia Bec/anan
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Daniel K. Brough (I 0283)
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
316S East Millrock Drive, Suite S00
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Telephone: (801) 438-2000
Facsimile: (801) 438-20S0
Email: dbrough@btjd.com
Attorneys for Cybertary Franchising, LLC; Franchise
Foundry, LLC, and Christian Faulconer
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF l;JTAH

*******
PATRICIA BECKMAN,

)
)

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.

CYBERTARY FRANCHISING, LLC;
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY, LLC;
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY HOLDINGS
ULC; CHRISTIAN FAULCONER; and K.
TODD HICKS,
Defendants/Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)

(PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
.LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED
'COMPLAINT

)

)

Case No. 110402922

)

)

Judge Darold J. McDade

)
)
)

*******
This matter came before the Court on the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint (the "Motion") filed by Plaintiff Patricia '3eckman ("Beckman"). The Court has
reviewed the Motion, the memorandum in support thereof, and the proposed Second Amended
Complaint. all filed by Beckman. The Court has also reviewed the memorandum in opposition
to the Motion, tiled by Defendants Cybertary Franchising, LLC, Franchise Foundry, LLC, and
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Christian Faulconer {collectively, uDefendants"}. Finally, the Court has reviewed the reply
memorandum in support of the Motion, filed by Beckman. Furthennore, on May 28, 2013, at
2:00 p.m., the Court heard oral argument on the Motion. Beckman was represented by Austin
Egan, and Defendants were represented by Daniel K. Brough. Being now fully apprised in the
premises, the Court hereby FINDS, CONCLUDES, and ORDERS as follows:
The Court FINDS that the Motion was untimely and the product of unreasonable delay,
and that Defendants would be prejudiced if Beckman were permitted to file her proposed Second
Amended Complaint.
The Court CONCLUDES that, based on the Court's findings noted above and the
standards articulated in Utah Rule of Civil Procedur~ IS(a), justice does not require the Court to
permit Beckman to file her proposed Second Amended Complaint, and the Court hereby
exercises its discretion to decline to permit Beckman to do so.
Therefore, the Court hereby orders that the Motion be, and hereby is, DENIED.
DATED this __ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2013.
~

BY THE COURT:

Hon. Darold J. McDade
Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court
District of Utah

2
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
STAVROSLAWP.C~
Gw

I

Isl Austin B, Egan

Signed by Daniel K. Brough with pennission of Austin K. Egan
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I certify that on the 29th day of May, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing [PROPOSED) FINDINGS OF FACT, ~ONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT to be
served via U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, upo~ the following:
Andrew W. Stavros
Austin B. Egan
STAVROS LAW P.C.
The Redman Building
J240 East 2100 South, Suite I00
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

Isl Ashley Carrico

~
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Order Regarding Motions in
Limine
October 10, 2014
(R. 1470)
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Order Prepared by:
Daniel K. Brough ( 10283)
James C. Dunkelberger (13690)
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
3165 East Millrock Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT84121
Telephone: (801) 438-2000
Facsimile: (801) 438-2050
Email: dbrough@btjd.com; jdunkelberger@btjd.com
Attorneys for Cybertary Franchising, LLC,
Franchise Foundry; LLC, and Christian Faulconer

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA BECKMAN,

*******
)

)
)

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS IN
LIMINE

)

vs.

)

CYBERTARY FRANCHISING, LLC,
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY, LLC,
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY HOLDINGS,
ULC, CHRISTIAN FAULCONER, and K.
TODD HICKS, an individual,

)

Case No. 110402922

)

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

Judge Darold J. McDade

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

*******
This matter came before the Court on the following motions in limine (the "Motions")
filed by Defendants Cybertary Franchising, LLC ("Cybertary"), Franchise Foundry, LLC
("Franchise Foundry") and Christian Faulconer ("Faulconer" and, collectively with Cybertary
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and Franchise Foundry, "Defendants"):

1. Motion in Limine to Exclude Recording of October 19, 2011 Conversation;
2. Motion in Limine to Admit Testimony of Christian Faulconer Regarding Reasons
for Termination;

3. Motion in Limine to Exclude All Evidence of Other Business Ventures of
Christian Faulconer and Franchise Foundry; and
4. Motion in Limine to Exclude All Evidence Bearing Solely on Claims Attempted to
Be Asserted in this Lawsuit, or Asserted in Second Lawsuit.
The Court has reviewed each of the motions in limine and all submissions, by all parties,
regarding those motions. Moreover, on September 24 2014, at 1:30 p.m., the Court heard oral
argument on each of the motions in limine. Plaintiff and Counterclaim Patricia Beckman was
represented by Austin B. Egan. Defendants were represented by Daniel K. Brough and James C.
Dunkelberger. Having reviewed the briefing and heard argument, the Court hereby rules a~
follows:
With respect to Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Recording of October 19, 2011

Conversation, the motion is hereby GRANTED. Beckman may not introduce the recording of
the October 19, 2011 telephone conversation (the "Recording") between Beckman and
Faulconer. The Court finds, after listening to the Recording, that the statements captured therein
constitute compromise negotiations. For this reason and others given on the record at the
hearing, the Recording is inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 408 for the purposes
Beckman offers it.
With respect to Defendants' Motion in Limine to Admit Testimony of Christian

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

October 10, 2014 04:35 PM

2 of 5

Faulconer Regarding Reasons for Termination, the motion is hereby DENIED for the reasons
stated when the Court excluded this testimony from its consideration of Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment in December 2013.
With respect to Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude All Evidence of Other Business

Ventures of Christian Faulconer and Franchise Foundry, the motion is hereby GRANTED
based on the parties' stipulation on the record at the hearing on the Motions. Beckman may not
~

introduce extrinsic evidence of Defendants' prior business dealings through the testimony of
Ryan Combe, Matt Kelly, or Tucker Nielsen. The Court defers to the time of trial all other
issues relating to evidence of prior business dealings including whether, and to what extent, such
evidence may be used for impeachment or inquired into under Utah Rule of Evidence 608.
With respect to Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude All Evidence Bearing Solely on

Claims Attempted to Be Asserted in this Lawsuit, or Asserted in Second Lawsuit, the motion is
hereby DENIED without prejudice to Defendants' ability to object to the material described in
the motion as the material is presented at trial.

HEREBY ENTERED BY THE COURT
EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE WHEN THE COURT STAMP IS AFFIXED
TO THE FIRST PAGE OF THIS DOCUMENT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DATED this 26th day of September, 2014.
STAVROS LAWP.C.

3
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Isl Austin B. Egan
Andrew W. Stavros
Austin B. Egan
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
(electronically signed by Daniel K. Brough with written
permission from Austin B. Egan)
Isl Daniel K. Brough

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

October 10, 2014 04:35 PM

4 of 5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 26th day of September, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS IN LIMINE to be served via U.S. Mail, first
class postage prepaid, upon the following:
Andrew W. Stavros
Austin B. Egan
STAVROS LAWP.C.
11693 South 700·East, Suite 200
Draper, UT 84020

Isl Shauna Harmon
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Jury's Verdict
October 10, 2014
(R. 1502)
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR UTAll COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA BECKMAN,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case Number: 110402922

CYBERTARY FRANCIDSINO, LLC,
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY, LLC,
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY HOLDINGS,
ULC, CHRISTIAN FAULCONER, and
K. TODD lllCK.S,

Judge Darold J. McDade
Division #10

Defendants.
MEMBERS OF TIIE JURY:
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented.

If you find that the issue has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, answer
"Yes.,, If you find that the evidence is equally balanced or that the greater weight of evidence is
against the issue, ~ "No."
At least six jmors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the

same six on each question. When six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each question
that is required to be answered, your foreperson should sign and date the form and then advise

v.iJ

the bailiff that you have reached a verdict.
We, the jury, answer the questions to us as follows:
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BECKMAN'S CLAIMS
Ms. Beckman's Claim for Breach of Contract against Cybertary Franchising, LLC

1.

Cybertary and Ms. Beckman agree they entered.into a valid and binding

Employment Agreement.
Proceed to question 2.

2.

Did Cybertary breach its contract with Ms. Beckman by failing to pay her

compensation and benefits?

Yes

X*

No--~

Regardless of whether the answer to question 2 is "Yes" or "No," proceed to question 3.
3.

Did Cybertary breach its contract with Ms. Beckman by tenninating her

employment without cause?

Yes

_x_

No

Ms. Beckman's Claim for Declaratory Judgment against Franchise Foundry, LLC, and
Christian Faulconer
If you answer question 2 with a "Yes," answer questions 4 and S.
4.

Did Franchise Foundry act with gross negligence or willful misconduct?

Yes
No

~

2
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S. ·

Did Mr. Faulconer act with gross negligence of willful misconduct?

Yes

__

No

¼

If you answer question 3 with a "Yes,,, answer questions 6 and 7.

6.

Did Franchise Fowidry act with gross negligence or willful misconduct?

Yes

~

No

7.
~

Did Mr. Faulconer act with gross negligence or willful misconduct?

Yes
No

BEq<MAN'S DAMAGES
8.

What amotm.t of damages, if any, do you award in favor of Ms. Beckman and

against Cybertary?
~

a~ 'l\3.83

Unpaid salary

$

Unpaid Monthly Benefits

s 1e1so.oo

Other F.conomic Damages

$

9.

o.oo

Do you also determine that Franchise Foundry is equally responsible for the

amount awarded, if any, in number 8?

Yes

"

No

10.

::t.__

Do you also determine that Mr. Faulconer is equally responsible for the
3
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~

amount awarded, if any, in number 8?

Yes
No
DATEDthis

~

10

4t:;

~
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Order on Motions for
Attorney's Fees
March 12, 2015
(R. 1823)

VJ

~
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Daniel K. Brough ( 10283)
James C. Dunkelberger (13690)
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
3165 East Millrock Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT84121
Telephone: (801) 438-2000
Facsimile: (801) 438-2050
Email: dbrough@btjd.com; jdunkelberger@btjd.com
Attorneys for Cybertary Franchising, LLC,
Franchise Foundry, LLC, and Christian Faulconer

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA BECKMAN,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.
CYBERTARY FRANCHISING, LLC,
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY, LLC,
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY HOLDINGS,
ULC, CHRISTIAN FAULCONER, an
individual, and K. TODD HICKS, an
individual,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

*******
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER REGARDING: (1)
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES, (2) DEFENDANTS'
CROSS-MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES, AND (3) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST,
AND DISMISSING CYBERTARY'S
CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION
Case No. 110402922

)

)

Judge Darold J. McDade

)
)

*******
This matter came before the Court on three motions: (1) the Motion for Attorney Fees
and Costs ("Beckman's Fee Motion") filed by Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Patricia
Beckman ("Beckman") on November 10, 2014; (2) the Cross-Motion for Attorney Fees and
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Costs ("Defendants' Fee Motion") filed by Defendants and Counterclaimants Cybertary
Franchising, LLC ("Cybertary"), Christian Faulconer ("Faulconer"), and Franchise Foundry,
LLC ("Franchise Foundry" and, collectively with Cybertary and Faulconer, "Defendants") on
December 2, 2014; and (3) Beckman's Motion for Prejudgment Interest (the "Prejudgment
Interest Motion") filed by Beckman on November 20, 2014. Also in connection with these three
motions, Beckman sought entry of a final judgment against Cybertary, arising from the trial
verdict.
The Court has reviewed Beckman's Fee Motion, Defendants' Fee Motion, and the
Prejudgment Interest Motion, as well as all documents submitted by all parties in connection
with them. The Court has also reviewed Beckman' s request for entry of a final judgment against
Cybertary and all documents submitted by all parties in connection with that request.
Furthermore, on February 4, 2015, the Court heard oral argument on Beckman's Fee Motion,
Defendants' Fee Motion, and the Prejudgment Interest Motion, as well as on Beckman's request
for entry of final judgment. At that hearing, Beckman was represented by Austin B. Egan, of the
law firm of Stavros Law, P .C., and Defendants were represented by Daniel K. Brough, of the law
firm of Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere. Now being fully advised in the premises, the Court
hereby rules as follows:
1.

Beckman's Fee Motion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. Section 16 of the

employment agreement between Beckman and Cybertary(the "Employment Agreement")

vii

provides that "[t]he nonprevailing party in any proceeding hereunder shall be the party that the
court of competent jurisdiction awards less than one-half ( 1/2) of aH of the amounts in dispute,"

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~
March 12. 2015 10:25 AM

Gw

and it requires the nonprevailing party to pay its own attorney fees and costs as well as the "other
party's" attorney fees and costs. The Court construes this language as mandating an assessment
of whether each party asserting a claim under the Employment Agreement is a "nonprevailing
party" under that claim. Because Cybertary was awarded less than one-half of the amounts it
sought against Beckman, it is the nonprevailing party with respect to its counterclaims, and it is
therefore required to pay Beckman' s attorney fees and costs incurred in defending against those
claims. Beckman is therefore awarded $75,317.24 in attorney fees and costs, against Cybertary,
attendant to the prosecution of her claims against Cybertary.
2.

Defendants' Fee Motion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. As defined by Section

16 of the Employment Agreement, Beckman is the nonprevailing party with respect to her claims
against Cybertary, having recovered less than one half of the amount she sought against
Cybertary pursuant to her claims against it under the Employment Agreement. She is therefore
required to pay Cybertary's attorney fees incurred in connection with its defense against
Beckman' s claims. Cybertary is therefore entitled to an award of $62,181.90 in attorney fees and
costs, against Beckman. That amount is reduced from the total amount Cybertary sought in
connection with Defendants' Fee Motion for the reasons the Court articulated on the record at
the hearing. Because of this award, Beckman's total award of attorney fees and costs is the
difference between the amount awarded to her in paragraph I of this Order, and the amount
awarded to Cybertary in paragraph 2 of this Order. That difference is a net award of attorney
fees and costs of $13,135.34, to Beckman. This is the amount to be included in Beckman's
judgment against Cybertary.

3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

March 12. 2015 10:25 AM

~

~

Furthermore, Franchise Foundry and Faulconer, separate and apart from any amounts
awarded to Cybertary, are hereby awarded $27,153.33 in attorney fees as against Beckman,
because they prevailed on Beckman' s claim against them under the Employment Agreement, as
set forth in the Court's January 2, 2014, order granting Franchise Foundry and Faulconer's
motion for summary judgment on that claim. Franchise Foundry and Faulconer shall be entitled
to a judgment against Beckman in that amount.
3.

The Prejudgment Interest Motion is hereby DENIED. The Court finds and

concludes that Beckman's damages are not the type of damages that are susceptible to an award
of prejudgment interest.
4.

Based on the stipulation of all parties who have appeared in this lawsuit,

Defendants' counterclaims for breach of contract and for permanent injunction are hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The hearing set on Defendants' request for permanent
injunction, set for March 4, 2015, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., is hereby STRICKEN.
5.

The content of this Order fully disposes of all claims and issues in this lawsuit,

and the lawsuit is now eligible for entry of final judgment.
HEREBY ENTERED BY THE COURT

EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE WHEN THE COURT STAMP IS AFFIXED
TO THE FIRST PAGE OF THIS DOCUMENT
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APPROVED AS TO FORM

~

STAVROS LAWP.C.

Isl Austin Egan
Andrew W. Stavros
Austin B. Egan
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
(electronically executed by Daniel K. Brough
with written permission from Austin B. Egan)
Isl Daniel K. Brough

~

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

M;m~h 1?. ?01~ 10·?~ AM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 27th day of February, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER REGARDING: (1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES,
~

(2) DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES, AND (3) PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, AND DISMISSING CYBERTARY'S
CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONto be
served via U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, upon the following:
Andrew W. Stavros
Austin B. Egan
STAVROS LAWP.C.
11693 South 700 East, Suite 200
Draper, UT 84020

Isl Rebeccah McCloud

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~
M~rr.h 1?. ?01fi 10·?~ AM

Final Judgment Against
Cybertary
March 12, 2015
(R. 1831)
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Andrew W. Stavros (#8615)
Austin 8. Egan (#13203)
STAVROS LAW P.C.
11693 South 700 East
Draper, Utah 84020
Tel: (801) 758.7604
Fax: (80 l) 893.3573
andy@stavroslaw.com
austin@stavroslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA BECKMAN,
Plaintiff,

FINAL JUDGMENT

V.

Case No. 110402922
CYBERTARY FRANCHISING, LLC;
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY, LLC;
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY HOLDINGS,
ULC; CHRISTRIAN FAULCONER, and
K. TODD HICKS,

Judge Darold J. McDade

Defendants.

A jury trial in this action occurred from October 7 through October 10, 2014. Plaintiff
Patricia Beckman (hereinafter referred to as "Beckman") was represented by Andrew Stavros
and Austin Egan. Defendants Cybertary Franchising, LLC (hereinafter referred to as
"Cybertary"), Franchise Foundry, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "Franchise Foundry") and
Christian Faulconer (hereinafter referred to as "Faulconern) were represented by Daniel Brough
and James Dunkelberger.
Defendants Franchise Foundry Holdings, ULC and K. Todd Hicks were never served and
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made no appearance at trial.
On October 9, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for a Directed Verdict and
dismissed Cybertary's counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional interference with existing and
potential economic relations, and unfair competition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § l 3-5a-101.
On October 10, 2014, the jury rendered its verdict and concluded: (1) Cybertary breached
its contact with Beckman and awarded Beckman $84,913.83 in unpaid salary and $18,150.00 in
unpaid monthly benefits; (2) Cybertary had cause to terminate Beckman's employment; (3)
Franchise Foundry did not act with gross negligence or willful misconduct; (4) Faulconer did not
act with gross negligence or willful misconduct; and (5) neither Franchise Foundry nor
Faulconer is responsible for the damages awarded to Ms. Beckman.
Based on the jury's verdict, the Court hereby enters a final judgment in favor of Beckman
and against Cybertary for:
(1)

the principal amount of $103,063.83;

(2)

attorney's fees totaling $13,135.34;

(3)

for a total judgment in the amount of $116,199.17.

Post-judgment interest at the rate of 2.27% per annum shall accrue from the date this
judgment is entered and continue to accrue until the judgment is paid in full.
This final judgment may be augmented for reasonable attorney's fees and costs in
connection with collecting on the judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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- END OF JUDGMENT THE COURT'S SIGNATURE APPEARS AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE
~

Proposed final judgment respectfully submitted on this the 9th day of March, 2015.

STAVROS LAW, P.C.

Isl Austin B. Egan
Austin B. Egan
Attorney for Plaintiff Patricia Beckman

APPROVED AS TO FORM
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

Isl Daniel K. Brough
Daniel K. Brough
Attorney for Defendants Cybertary Franchising, LLC,
Franchise Foundry, LLC, and Christian Faulconer

VP
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I certify that on March 9, 2015, I e-filed the foregoing proposed FINAL JUDGMENT,
using GreenFiling, which sent automatic notification of the same to:
Daniel K. Brough
James Dunkelburger
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
3165 East Millrock Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

Austin B. Egan

~

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

March 12. 2015 10:28 AM

.:1nf4

{jj)

Final Judgment Against
Beckman
March 12, 2015
(R. 1827)
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Daniel K. Brough (10283)
James C. Dunkelberger (13690)
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
3165 East Millrock Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT84121
Telephone: (801) 438-2000
Facsimile: (801) 438-2050
Email: dbrough@btjd.com; idunkelberger@btid.com

~

Attorneys for Cyberta,y Franchising, LLC,
Franchise Foundry, LLC, and Christian Faulconer

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA BECKMAN,

*******
)

)
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

)

)
vs.

JUDGMENT
Case No. 110402922

)

CYBERTARY FRANCHISING, LLC,
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY, LLC,
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY HOLDINGS,
ULC, CHRISTIAN FAULCONER, an
individual, and K. TODD HICKS, an
individual,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

)
)

Judge Darold J. McDade

)
)

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

*******
Pursuant to the Court's January 2, 2014, Order (1) Overruling in Part and Sustaining in
Part Plaintiffs Objection; (2) Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and (3)
Granting i!l Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
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wherein the Court granted the motion of Defendants Franchise Foundry, LLC ("Franchise
Foundry") and Christian Faulconer ("Faulconer") for summary judgment on Plaintiff Patricia
Beckman 's ("Beckman") claim for breach of contract against Franchise Foundry and Faulconer,
and pursuant to the Court's Order Regarding: (1) Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney Fees, (2)
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Attorney Fees, and (3) Plaintiffs Motion for Prejudgment
Interest, and Dismissing Cybertary's Claims for Breach of Contract and Permanent Injunction,
wherein the Court awarded Franchise Foundry and Faulconer the sum of $27,153.33 in attorney
fees and costs:
JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of Franchise Foundry and Faulconer, and against
Beckman, in the amount of $27,153.33, along with all attorney fees incurred by Franchise
Foundry or Faulconer in collecting upon that judgment, as well as postjudgment interest at
2.27% per annum, as set forth at Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-4(3)(a) accruing on the total principal
judgment amount until paid in full.
HEREBY ENTERED BY THE COURT
EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE WHEN THE COURT STAMP IS AFFIXED
TO THE FIRST PAGE OF THIS DOCUMENT
APPROVED AS TO FORM

~

STAVROS LAW P.C.

Isl Austin Egan
Andrew W. Stavros
Austin B. Egan
Attorneys for PlaintifJ/Counterclaim Defendant
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(electronically executed by Daniel K. Brough
with written permission from Austin B. Egan)
Isl Daniel K. Brough
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I certify that on the 27th day of February, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENT to be served via U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, upon the
following:
Andrew W. Stavros
Austin B. Egan
STAVROS LAWP.C.
11693 South 700 East, Suite 200
Draper, UT 84020

Isl Rebeccah McCloud
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